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Summary
Prior studies explain the early adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
by ﬁrm-speciﬁc beneﬁts. However, IFRS adoption also leads to increased disclosure and reduced
accounting choices, resulting in a loss of private beneﬁts for company insiders. This paper argues
that this loss depends on characteristics of the institutional environment (i.e. the level of investor
protection). We ﬁnd that in countries with strong laws or extensive corporate governance codes
IFRS is more likely adopted as the loss of private beneﬁts for company insiders is smaller. Fur-
thermore, corporate governance recommendations are as effective as laws in stimulating IFRS
adoption and become more important when laws are weaker.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Growth in international trade and capital ﬂows and a rising cross-border
economic integration over the past two decades have led to the desire to har-
monise accounting standards across countries. In Europe, a harmonisation
process started in the seventies and eighties with the publication of a number
of EC Directives (Council of the European Commission (EC) (1978, 1983)).
A major step in this harmonisation process has been taken in 2005 with the
adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by all
listed companies in the European Union. The decision to oblige listed com-
panies to use IFRS from 2005 onwards was taken by the European Commis-
sion in 2000 (EC (2000)). Immediately after this decision in 2000, a number
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of countries, such as the Netherlands and Austria, allowed companies to use
IFRS as an alternative for the local standards in order to smoothen the
changeover to IFRS in 2005. Some other countries, such as France, Belgium,
Germany and Italy, already permitted listed companies to follow IFRS before
the decision by the EC in 2000.1 As a result, a number of European com-
panies were already using IFRS before it became mandatory in 2005. These
companies are called ‘early adopters’.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants of early IFRS
adoption in Europe.2 Documenting these determinants is important as it
provides insights into the costs and beneﬁts associated with the mandatory
switch to IFRS in 2005.
Prior studies investigating the determinants (Cuijpers and Buijink (2005);
La Porta et al. (1998); El-Gazzar et al. (1999)) focused on the beneﬁts of
IFRS adoption, assuming that company insiders’ incentives are irrelevant.
However, the choice for IFRS also results in costs for company insiders (e.g.
majority shareholders and managers). As the adoption of IFRS is associated
with an increase in disclosure and a decrease in the number of accounting
method choices (Ashbaugh (2001); Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001); Leuz and
Verrecchia (2000)), it leads to a decline in managerial discretion and a loss of
private beneﬁts for company insiders. Fewer opportunities to manage earnings
under IFRS make it more difﬁcult to divert assets from the company, inﬂu-
ence the performance related bonus or sell assets below their market value
to majority shareholders. In this study, we explicitly incorporate these costs
as they may offer an explanation why only 15% of the EU companies have
adopted IFRS in 2002 (PwC (2002)).3
The decrease in private beneﬁts of control will however not be the same
in all countries. Recent empirical work has found that the value of pri-
vate beneﬁts is negatively associated with the level of investor protection
provided by countries (Dyck and Zingales (2004); Nenova (2003)). We
hypothesize that company insiders have a higher cost of adopting IFRS in
countries with weak investor protection as the reduction in private beneﬁts
after IFRS adop-tion is larger in these countries. Although the literature typ-
1 These countries have allowed the use of IFRS since 1998.
2 Early or voluntary adoption refers to the fact that companies have adopted IFRS before
it became mandatory in 2005. This terminology is consistently used in prior studies (Cuijpers
and Buijink (2005); Dumontier and Raffournier (1998); El-Gazzar (1999)) and indicates that
companies could choose to follow IFRS before 2005. In this study, it actually boils down to
studying the determinants of the use of IFRS in 2001.
3 The increase in disclosure following IFRS adoption may also lead to proprietary costs.
However, given the high level of private beneﬁts (Coffee (2001); Dyck and Zingales (2004)) and
the concentrated ownership structures (La Porta et al. (1998)) in the countries under study, we
believe that loss of private beneﬁts constitutes the largest cost associated with the adoption of
IFRS. Nevertheless, we do include in our model proprietary costs as possible determinants of
IFRS adoption, but we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant results. This indicates that proprietary costs do
not restrain companies from adopting IFRS.
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ically focuses on legal investor protection (La Porta et al. (1998)), we also
consider a measure of voluntary investor protection, measured by the exten-
siveness of corporate governance recommendations, as a characteristic of the
institutional
environment.
This study thus contributes to the literature by investigating IFRS adop-
tion from an insider perspective and by linking the decrease in private ben-
eﬁts of control to characteristics of the institutional environment. To our
knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to document a relation between corporate
governance codes and the choice of accounting standards. Furthermore, this
study provides insight into the relation between managerial opportunism and
company decisions, which in turn have an impact on the transparency in cap-
ital markets. Finally, our study provides evidence on how the costs of manda-
tory IFRS adoption differ across countries.
Using a sample of 1563 European companies that are allowed to use IFRS
in 2001, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more likely to adopt IFRS in 2001 when inves-
tor protection is strong, i.e. when the decrease in insiders’ private beneﬁts
from IFRS adoption is small. The results also show that laws and recommen-
dations are equally effective in curbing private beneﬁts of control and thus in
enhancing the likelihood of IFRS adoption. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that corpo-
rate governance recommendations and laws serve as substitutes as the impact
of corporate governance recommendations on the early adoption of IFRS is
larger in countries with weak laws. Finally, when we look at speciﬁc corporate
governance recommendations and laws, we ﬁnd that not all recommendations
have an impact on IFRS adoption. Corporate governance recommendations
with regard to speciﬁc shareholder rights, such as the one share/one vote rule,
have no signiﬁcant impact on the adoption of IFRS, although laws prescrib-
ing the same rights do.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give an
overview of the existing literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 speci-
ﬁes the data collection and deﬁnes the model and variables. Section 4 presents
the results and some robustness tests. Finally, the main conclusions are
summarized in section 5.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Recently, a big step in the harmonization process of accounting has been
taken as listed companies in the European Union have to use International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) from 2005 onwards for their consoli-
dated ﬁnancial statements. The introduction of these international standards
has a number of consequences. It leads not only to companies using the same
accounting standards across countries, but also to a higher accounting qual-
ity in Europe. Compared to most local accounting standards of Continental
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European countries, IFRS requires more disclosure of information and limits
the amount of accounting choices available to managers (Ashbaugh (2001);
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001); Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)). As a consequence,
IFRS leads to less accounting discretion and hence curbs the private beneﬁts
insiders can extract from the company.
This reduction in private beneﬁts of control following IFRS adoption can be
rather substantial since most Continental European countries are characterized
by concentrated ownership structures (La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)). Prior liter-
ature has established that the private beneﬁts of control are considerably high
in countries with concentrated ownership structures (Dyck and Zingales (2004);
Nenova (2003)). For example, in Italy, the average value of control is worth 37%
of the equity value of the ﬁrm (Dyck and Zingales (2004)).
Consequently, company insiders in these countries tend to have a pref-
erence for poor ﬁrm transparency in order to protect their private beneﬁts
of control. The more accurate and detailed the accounting information is,
the more difﬁcult it is for an insider to expropriate value without incurring
legal penalties or reputational costs (Ferrell (2004)). This is evidenced by the
ﬁndings of La Porta et al. (2004) that an increase in mandatory disclosure
requirements is associated with a substantial decrease in the level of private
beneﬁts. Also Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that the level of disclosure neg-
atively inﬂuences the private beneﬁts insiders can extract. They ﬁnd that one
standard deviation increase in disclosure reduces the value of control by 9%.
The amount of private beneﬁts insiders have to give up after adopt-
ing IFRS will depend on the level of investor protection offered by coun-
tries. According to Benos and Weisbach (2004), the most important factor
explaining the level of private beneﬁts is the legal environment in which the
company operates. In countries with extensive investor protection, private
beneﬁts of control are already curbed independent of the accounting stan-
dards used (Coffee (2001); Leuz et al. (2003)). For instance, Nenova (2003)
and Dyck and Zingales (2004) ﬁnd that the value of private beneﬁts is lower
in countries with better laws protecting investors. As a result, in countries
with strong legal shareholder protection, the costs of adopting IFRS are low
as insiders have few private beneﬁts. For instance, Leuz et al. (2003) ﬁnd that
the level of earnings management, through which insiders try to hide their
expropriation, is lower in countries with strong investor protection, as insiders
have less to hide. A number of other studies (e.g. Ali and Hwang (2000); Ball
et al. (2000); Hung (2001)) show that in countries with weak investor protec-
tion, the accounting quality and transparency is lower.4
4 This is also consistent with the literature on the decision of companies to cross-list in the
US. Doidge (2004) ﬁnds that after cross-listing in the US, the private beneﬁts decrease and this
decrease is larger for companies from countries with weak investor protection. The reason is
that by cross-listing, companies have to comply with more stringent disclosure requirements
and are subjected to stronger laws protecting investors.
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Therefore, our ﬁrst hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H1: There is a positive association between the extent to which laws protect
shareholders and the early adoption of IFRS.
In this paper we also include a feature of the institutional environment not
yet studied, namely the comprehensiveness of corporate governance recom-
mendations. The recent accounting scandals, such as Enron, Worldcom and
Ahold, have given rise to various initiatives to develop national and inter-
national corporate governance codes. Many of these corporate governance
codes, such as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), state
that the corporate governance framework should ensure the disclosure of
timely and accurate information. Most codes also formulate recommendations
with regard to the rights of shareholders, such as the right to appoint man-
agement. Finally, corporate governance improves the monitoring of company
insiders by, for instance, recommending the presence of independent directors
on the board of directors. Therefore, extensive corporate governance recom-
mendations may reduce the level of expropriation by insiders. So corporate
governance recommendations can be seen as a measure of voluntary investor
protection5 and based on the same reasoning as for laws protecting investors,
we hypothesize:
H2: There is a positive association between the extensiveness of corporate gov-
ernance recommendations and the early adoption of IFRS.
Furthermore, as corporate governance recommendations are not manda-
tory and can not be enforced by any authoritative body, we expect that their
effect on IFRS adoption is smaller than the effect of laws.
H3: The impact of corporate governance recommendations on the early adoption
of IFRS is smaller than the impact of laws protecting shareholders.
Finally, we also formulate a hypothesis with respect to the relation
between corporate governance recommendations and laws protecting inves-
tors. According to Black (2001), alternative sources of protection become
more important if legal rules are too weak to provide protection. In coun-
tries with weak laws protecting investors, the private beneﬁts for insiders are
high. In these countries extensive corporate governance recommendations, as
an alternative for laws, could lead to companies being less inclined to extract
value, even though laws protecting investors are lacking. So, we expect laws
and recommendations to serve as substitutes.
H4: The impact of corporate governance recommendations on the early adoption
of IFRS increases as laws protecting investors become weaker.
5 We designate corporate governance recommendations as the level of voluntary investor pro-
tection because in Europe companies are not required to follow these recommendations, which
is in contrast to the US where corporate governance is mandated by laws.
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3 DATA AND METHOD
3.1 Data
Our sample consists of all the listed companies from EU countries that
allow the choice between local GAAP and IFRS for domestic and foreign
companies in 2001.6,7 Our sample thus comprehends companies listed in
seven EU Member States, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Italy and the Netherlands. This leads to an initial sample of 2,594
listed companies (see Table 1). Of these 2,594 companies, 213 or 8% use
IFRS. The following companies are then removed from the sample: compa-
nies listed on the German New Market,8 companies reporting according to
US GAAP, companies with missing data on the control variables, and out-
liers. A sample of 1,563 companies remains, of which 110 companies (7%)
voluntarily report according to IFRS in 2001.9
In order to investigate the impact of laws protecting investors and corpo-
rate governance recommendations on the early adoption of IFRS, we develop
two indices. First, we construct a corporate governance index (CGIj ) measur-
ing the extensiveness of corporate governance recommendations in each coun-
try based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) and the
Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes published by the Euro-
pean Commission in 2002. Our index consists of 50 recommendations (see
Appendix 1) which are grouped into ﬁve categories: general principles, prin-
ciples concerning the board of directors, board committees, shareholders, and
disclosure. These 50 recommendations are a selection from the OECD prin-
ciples so that we have a good balance between transparency and complete-
ness. We use the OECD principles as a benchmark because they are widely
accepted and referred to.10 We select, however, only the principles that can be
straightforward interpreted as pro-investors. Other studies drawing up corpo-
rate governance ratings for companies include largely the same principles and
subcategories (e.g., Black et al. (2006); Drobetz (2003); Beiner et al. (2006);
Gompers (2001)).
6 We use the total sample of listed companies and not a matched sample because match-
ing will lead to an overclassiﬁcation of IFRS companies and as a result to biased estimators
(Zmijewski (1984)).
7 2001 was the latest year with ﬁnancial information when we started this study.
8 Companies listed on the New Market segment of the German Market are obliged to sub-
mit their ﬁnancial statements using either IFRS or US GAAP.
9 We veriﬁed from the hard copies that companies following IFRS according to Datastream
effectively stated compliance with IFRS in their audit report.
10 For instance, the World Bank uses these principles as a benchmark to draw up country
corporate governance assessments. Also the IMF and the International Corporate Governance
Network (ICGN) subscribe to the principles of the OECD.
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To score the countries on this index, we use the Comparative Study
of Corporate Governance Codes of all EU countries published by the EC
(2002).11 The scoring of the index is simple: a principle is either present in
a country code (YES, score equals 1) or not (NO, score equals 0).12 We sum
all scores and rescale the scores on the categories to 1 so that each category
has an equal weight in the total score of the index.13
Second, we develop a measure for the extensiveness of legal shareholder
protection in a country (LAW2001j ). We update a shareholders’ rights index
originally developed by La Porta et al. (1998). This original index is a com-
bination of 7 shareholder rights based on the company law and commercial
code of countries in 1993 and is the ﬁrst to quantify the extent of laws pro-
tecting investors.14 We do not only update this index but also extend it to
make it more in line with recent changes in laws and with our corporate gov-
ernance index. Our law index for 2001 comprehends 27 principles classiﬁed
under three categories: board of directors, shareholders and disclosure (see
Appendix 2).
In contrast to La Porta et al. (1998), we are only looking at laws in civil
law countries, which consist of bright-line rules. Compared to common law
countries, which are more principle based, judges in civil law countries are not
supposed to go beyond the statutes. This special feature of civil laws makes it
easy and straightforward to quantify the laws. Again, we only include princi-
ples that can be interpreted as pro-investors. The scoring method is the same
as with our corporate governance index.15
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of our two indices. Panel A presents
the scores on the corporate governance index. Germany has the highest score
on the corporate governance index (0.525), followed by Belgium (0.452). In
contrast, Austria has no corporate governance recommendations in 2001.
When we take a look at the categories of the corporate governance index,
we see that large differences occur between countries. For instance, Belgium
attaches a lot of value to principles on the board of directors (0.794), while
11 Only corporate governance codes that are published before January 2001 are taken into
account. This means that we measure the extensiveness of corporate governance recommenda-
tions at the beginning of our sample period.
12 For some principles, such as the independence of the board of directors (principle 15) and
of the board committees (principles 27 to 32), the score can be 0, 0.5, or 1. The score equals 1
if a code recommends that the majority of directors or members of the committees should be
independent. The score is equal to 0.5 if independence is only required for a minimum num-
ber of directors. If this topic is not covered by the codes or if the number of independent
members is not speciﬁed, the score is 0.
13 Our results are robust to using other ways of weighing the principles and categories.
14 The index covers, for instance, ease of participation in corporate voting and legal protec-
tion against expropriation by management.
15 As a robustness check, we used in the regressions the original index developed by La
Porta et al. (1998). The results become slightly less signiﬁcant. We also applied other weighing
schemes and ﬁnd that our results are robust.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































58 A. RENDERS AND A. GAEREMYNCK
France focuses on board committees (0.631). Finally, Germany stresses in its
corporate governance codes the importance of shareholders (0.625) and of
disclosure (0.548).
Panel B presents the scores of the countries on the law index. Austria has
by and large the best legal shareholder protection (0.754), followed by Ger-
many (0.569). So the two countries with the most companies following IFRS
(see Table 1) also have the strongest shareholder protection, either through
corporate governance recommendations or through laws. As is the case with
the corporate governance index, Germany emphasizes the protection of share-
holders in its laws (0.706). Austria scores the highest on the other two cate-
gories, namely board of directors (0.667) and disclosure (1.0).
3.2 Model and variable deﬁnitions
Estimation is done by means of a logistic regression with Rogers (1993) stan-
dard errors. A logistic regression is a technique for analysing the effects of
a number of explanatory variables on a dichotomous dependent variable.
However, different from prior studies (Cuijpers and Buijink (2005); Dumon-
tier and Raffournier (1998); El-Gazzar et al. (1999)), we do not use a tra-
ditional logistic model as the ﬁrm-level observations within one country are
not independent. Therefore, we estimate Rogers (1993) standard errors, which
are White standard errors adjusted to take into account possible correlation
within a cluster, in this case within a country (Petersen (2005); Rogers (1993);
Williams (2000)).16 The model looks as follows:
log(Pij /1−Pij )=α+β1LAW2001j +β2CGIj +β3CGIj ∗LAW2001j






+β14LEVERAGEij +β15PEij +β16MTBVij + εij
With i = company and j = country.
16 Reliance on the Rogers (1993) standard errors reduces the estimation error but does not
eliminate it as the number of clusters (i.e. countries) in our paper is rather small (<10)
(Petersen (2005)). However, we also performed the regression with dummy variables for the
countries (see section 5.3), which is another method to take into account country variation.
Our results stay robust.
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The ratio of log [Pij /1−Pij ] is the log odds ratio or logit of the probability
that company i in country j has adopted IFRS in 2001. The base category of
the dependent variable is when a company is using local GAAP (IFRSij =0).
We include as test variables our corporate governance index (CGIj ) (ﬁrst
hypothesis), our law index (LAW2001j ) (second hypothesis), and an interac-
tion term between these two variables (third hypothesis). Positive values on
the coefﬁcients indicate that the odds of using IFRS increase as the values of
the independent variables increase. The fourth hypothesis is tested through a
Wald test on the difference in the size of the coefﬁcients β1 and β2.
Next to the test variables, we include in our regression three country con-
trol variables. First of all, we introduce a proxy for the distance between local
accounting standards and IFRS (DIST IFRSj ) based on Street (2002). This
variable gives an indication of the number of adjustments an average com-
pany has to make to its ﬁnancial reporting in order to comply with IFRS.17
The higher this variable, the more costly the switch to IFRS and therefore we
expect to ﬁnd a negative sign for this control variable.
Secondly, we include a measure of earnings management at the country
level (EMj ).18 This variable measures the extent to which insiders behave
opportunistically under the local accounting standards. When the level of
earnings management under local accounting standards is high, insiders can
extract a lot of private beneﬁts without being discovered. As under IFRS the
possibility to manage earnings, and thus to extract private beneﬁts, is severely
reduced, companies in countries with a high level of earnings management
have a lower incentive to switch to IFRS. So we predict a negative sign.
Finally, we introduce in our model a measure for the size of the capital
market, namely total market capitalization of listed companies as a percent-
age of GDP (MARKET CAPj ).19 Companies in countries with large capital
markets have a large investor base in their home market and do not need to
use international accounting standards to tap into other markets to obtain
sufﬁcient equity funding.
Next to the country control variables, we also introduce some company
control variables. First, we include company size (SIZEi). Larger compa-
nies have smaller information production costs (Lang and Lundholm (1993))
and lower costs of competitive disadvantage associated with their disclosures
(Meek and Roberts (1995)). We measure size by the natural logarithm of mar-
ket value of equity.
17 It is based on approximately 80 accounting measures and disclosures (Street (2002)).
18 This variable is developed by Leuz et al. (2003) and is an aggregate score of four earn-
ings management measures for the period between 1990 and 1999. The earnings management
measures reﬂect both the level and variability of the reported earnings. They cover the extent
of smoothing, the magnitude of accruals and small loss avoidance based on Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997).
19 We obtained this data from the World Bank.
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A second company control variable is the presence of a big-ﬁve auditor
(AUDITORi). This variable is assumed to have a positive effect on the early
adoption of IFRS as large audit ﬁrms may stimulate companies to disclose
more information (Raffournier (1995)). Big-ﬁve audit ﬁrms are also more
experienced in the application of IFRS (Dumontier and Raffournier (1998);
Murphy (1999)).
Third, we introduce a variable indicating whether or not the company
is a ﬁnancial institution (FINANCIAL INDi) based on the two-digit SIC-
codes. Financial institutions will postpone the adoption of IFRS as in 2001
the accounting standards that are particularly aimed at ﬁnancial institutions,
namely IAS 32 and IAS 39, were not yet endorsed by the EC.
Next, we introduce the variable LISTINGSi measuring the number of for-
eign stock exchanges a company is listed on. Companies that are listed on
multiple stock exchanges have to comply with more stock exchange require-
ments (Cuijpers and Buijink (2005); Meek and Roberts (1995)). Thus, these
companies can be expected to disclose more. Companies listed on multiple
exchanges also have many foreign investors and IFRS is speciﬁcally aimed at
satisfying the needs of these investors (El-Gazzar et al. (1999)).
We also add a measure of ownership concentration (OWNERSHIPi). This
variable is calculated as the ratio of closely held shares20 over common shares
outstanding. We hypothesize a negative sign for this variable. Companies with
wide ownership diffusion have high potential information asymmetries and
high agency costs, resulting in more demands for ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
(Cuijpers and Buijink (2005)). As a consequence, they have an incentive to
respond to these demands by switching to IFRS as this can lower their cost
of capital (Cohen (2004); Raffournier (1995)).
The next two company control variables capture the proprietary costs of
companies. Models such as Dye (1986) and Hayes and Lundholm (1996)
argue that the probability of disclosure decreases as the associated propri-
etary costs increase. By switching to IFRS, companies reveal more proprietary
information. Hence, companies with large proprietary costs will not adopt
IFRS until it becomes mandatory. We include two variables, namely CAP-
ITAL INTi,which is the ratio of property, plant and equipment over total
assets, and GROWTHi , which measures the growth opportunities of compa-
nies. High capital intensity is generally interpreted as a major barrier to entry
(Piotroski (2003)) as new entrants have to make large investments, which low-
ers the proprietary costs of information. In contrast, companies with high
future growth opportunities have to preserve these future opportunities and
protect them from possible entrants. We measure future growth opportunities
by the sales growth of the company over 2001, based on Cohen (2004).
20 These include shares held by ofﬁcers, directors and their immediate family, shares of the
company held by another corporation, shares held by pension or beneﬁt plans and shares held
by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares.
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The following variable, LEVERAGEi , may proxy for the governance struc-
ture of a company (Dumontier and Raffournier (1998); Meek and Roberts
(1995); Cohen (2004)) but also for the amount of equity ﬁnancing (El-Gazzar
et al. (1999); Murphy (1999)). As a proxy for the governance structure, we
would assume a positive coefﬁcient. As highly levered ﬁrms have higher
agency costs, these companies are more likely to adopt IFRS to reduce these
costs. On the other hand, if leverage is used as a proxy for the ﬁnancing
structure of a company, we would assume a negative coefﬁcient. Under this
reasoning, companies with a low leverage are more dependent on equity
ﬁnancing and are hence more likely to increase disclosure to satisfy the infor-
mation demands of the capital market. We measure this variable as the ratio
of long-term debt over total assets, but we do not predict the sign of this
variable.
Finally, we include two market performance measures, namely price-to-
earnings-per-share ratio (PEi) and market-to-book-value (MTBVi). Proﬁtable,
well-run companies have incentives to distinguish themselves from less proﬁt-
able ﬁrms in order to raise capital on the best available terms. One way to do
this is through voluntary disclosure (Foster (1986)).
An overview of the variables can be found in Table 3.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Univariate results
As the main purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between
the institutional environment and the decision to adopt IFRS, it is interesting
to test ﬁrst whether a signiﬁcant relation exists between the countries and
the fraction of companies that use IFRS in 2001. The chisquare statistic
(not reported) indicates that a highly signiﬁcant association (p< 0.001) exists
between countries and the fraction of companies using IFRS. Austria and
Germany have more companies than expected following IFRS, while the
opposite holds for Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy and the Netherlands. So
differences in the early adoption of IFRS across countries seem to be related
with dissimilarities in their institutional environment.
4.2 Multivariate results
The results of the logistic regression with robust standard errors are pre-
sented in Table 4.21 The pseudo R2 indicates that the model is relatively well
21 We computed the Variance of Inﬂation Factors (VIFs) in order to search for problems of
multicollinearity. The VIFs are all below 7.50 for the country variables and below 2.40 for
the company variables. So no problems of multicollinearity will arise in our regressions as the
VIFs are below 10.
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speciﬁed, as it explains about 32% of the variance in IFRS adoption.22 The
Likelihood ratio statistic shows that our model has signiﬁcant explanatory
power. Compared to a naı¨ve classiﬁcation rule that would classify companies
randomly into categories, our model classiﬁes almost 94% of the observations
correctly if we use a cut-off rate of 50%. However, as we have only a very
small number of companies using IFRS in 2001, it is more appropriate to use
a cut-off rate equal to the sample frequency, i.e. 7%. The results show that
our model still does a good job as it classiﬁes 78% of the observations cor-
rectly, which is well above the 50% of a random classiﬁcation.
With respect to the signiﬁcance of the individual variables, the results show
that strong laws protecting shareholders (LAW2001j ) encourage companies to
comply early with IFRS (t = 23.65). We also ﬁnd that corporate governance
recommendations (CGIj ) are positively associated with the adoption of IFRS
(t = 20.89). These results are consistent with our ﬁrst two hypotheses and
indicate that in countries with weak laws protecting shareholders and few cor-
porate governance recommendations there is a large loss of private beneﬁts
associated with IFRS adoption.
We run a Wald test on the coefﬁcients of our corporate governance and
law index to test whether they are signiﬁcantly different from each other. Sur-
prisingly, we fail to ﬁnd that they are signiﬁcantly different (p= 0.796) and
thereby the third hypothesis is not conﬁrmed. This indicates that corporate
governance recommendations have an equally strong impact on the adoption
of IFRS as laws protecting shareholders.
Next, we ﬁnd that the interaction effect between laws and recommenda-
tions is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t = −20.23) and has a negative coefﬁ-
cient. This is consistent with our fourth hypothesis: in countries with strong
corporate governance recommendations but weak laws, corporate governance
recommendations become more important.
The results with regard to the country control variables conﬁrm our expec-
tations. We ﬁnd that as the distance between local GAAP and IFRS increases,
early adoption of IFRS decreases. Secondly, our results show that more earn-
ings management under local GAAP results in a lower likelihood of adopting
IFRS. Companies in countries with a lot of accounting ﬂexibility tend to safe-
guard their private beneﬁts by postponing the changeover to IFRS. Thirdly,
our results indicate that as the size of the capital market increases, companies
stick to their local accounting standards. In countries with large equity mar-
kets, companies have less need to switch to international accounting standards
to tap into other markets to obtain sufﬁcient equity funding.
22 In logistic regressions, there is no true R2 value as there is in OLS regressions. How-
ever, some measures have been developed that have an analogous interpretation. SAS calcu-
lates Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke (1991)). Prior studies ﬁnd a pseudo R2 of about
18% (Ashbaugh (2001); Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001); Cuijpers and Buijink (2005)).
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DIST IFRSj −0.70∗∗∗ −25.24
EMj −0.57∗∗∗ −15.02




FINANCIAL INDi −1.19∗∗∗ −10.28
LISTINGSi 0.05∗ 1.82
OWNERSHIPi −0.94∗∗∗ −5.14







Likelihood ratio (Chisq) 250.55∗∗∗
Correctly classiﬁed (cut-off = 0.5) 93.60%
Correctly classiﬁed (cut-off = 0.07) 78.25%
aThe dependent variable is the logit of IFRS adoption in 2001 The regression is performed with
clustered robust standard errors (Rogers (1993)) to control for within country-correlation.
∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1% level,
∗∗signiﬁcant at 5% level,
∗signiﬁcant at 10% level
For the company control variables we ﬁnd that large, non-ﬁnancial com-
panies with a Big Five auditor and that are listed on more stock exchanges
have a higher rate of early compliance with IFRS. Furthermore, as expected,
companies with a low ownership concentration are more likely to adopt
IFRS before it is mandatory. However, contrarily to prior studies, we do
not ﬁnd that proprietary costs are important explanatory variables. Also the
coefﬁcients on sales growth, leverage, price-earnings ratio and market-to-book
value are insigniﬁcant.
As an extension to the basic model, the different categories of the
corporate governance index (general principles, board of directors, board
EARLY IFRS ADOPTION 65
committees, shareholders’ rights, and disclosure) are introduced separately
into the model. We also include an interaction variable between the subcate-
gory and the law index. A similar analysis is repeated for the categories of our
law index (board of directors, shareholders’ rights, and disclosure). For brev-
ity reasons, we do not report the results of these regressions. We ﬁnd, for our
corporate governance categories, that strong recommendations with regard
to the board of directors, the board committees, and disclosure encourage
the adoption of IFRS. Surprisingly, extensive recommendations with respect
to shareholders do not seem to have an impact on the likelihood of adopt-
ing IFRS. Concerning the categories of our law index, we ﬁnd that all three
categories, namely board of directors, shareholders and disclosure, are posi-
tively related with the early adoption of IFRS. This suggests that the protec-
tion of shareholders’ rights can only be achieved through hard laws. In other
words, corporate governance recommendations can not substitute completely
for laws. There are still some areas in which mandatory investor protection is
needed in order to reduce the extraction of private beneﬁts.
4.3 Robustness checks
We perform some robustness checks with regard to the country variables.
First, we recompute the scores of our corporate governance and law index
without rescaling the scores on the categories. So the total score on the indi-
ces is equal to the sum of the scores on the principles. We ﬁnd that our results
are robust. Second, we run our basic regression without the country vari-
ables but with 6 dummy variables for the countries. We use Germany as our
base country. We ﬁnd that, compared to Germany, only Austria has a positive
impact on IFRS adoption. Italy has the most negative impact on IFRS adop-
tion. Finally, we use the original shareholder protection index developed by
La Porta et al. (1998) instead of our own extended and updated index. Our
results still hold, but the p-values on the law index and the interaction var-
iable become slightly less signiﬁcant, indicating that our own law index has
more explanatory power.
We also perform some sensitivity checks with regard to the company con-
trol variables. First, the size of a company is alternatively measured by the
natural logarithm of total assets and of sales. These alternative speciﬁca-
tions do not alter our ﬁndings. The number of listings is also speciﬁed differ-
ently. We measure this variable alternatively as an indicator variable indicating
whether or not a company is listed on another stock exchange that allows the
use of IFRS. We also measure this variable as an indicator variable indicat-
ing whether or not a company is listed on a stock exchange outside the EU.
The p-value is the lowest and becomes marginally signiﬁcant for the variable
measuring a listing outside the EU.
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To tackle the possible problem of omitted variables in the model, we per-
form two additional analyses: a matched sample and the use of random and
ﬁxed effects models. Instead of using all companies that report according to
local accounting standards, we match the companies using IFRS with compa-
nies using local GAAP on the basis of country, size and industry. We ﬁnd that
our results hold. Secondly, we run both a country ﬁxed and a country random
effects model. In doing so, we remove the unobserved effect at country level
from the error term of the regression. Based on the Hausman test, the random
effects model appears to be the appropriate speciﬁcation, which indicates that
the unobserved effects are not correlated with the other explanatory variables.
In both speciﬁcations, our results hold. These additional analyses suggest that
our ﬁndings are probably not inﬂuenced by omitted variable bias.
5 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to explain the early adoption of IFRS using an
insider cost perspective. As IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in
disclosure and a reduction in accounting choices, it leads to less managerial
discretion and a loss of private beneﬁts for company insiders. In this study,
we argue that the degree to which insiders have to give up private beneﬁts
by adopting IFRS depends on characteristics of the institutional environment.
We investigate, besides the level of legal investor protection, also a character-
istic of the institutional environment not yet studied, namely corporate gov-
ernance recommendations.
Our results reveal that IFRS adoption depends on the level of investor pro-
tection. Companies refrain from adopting IFRS before it becomes mandatory
in 2005 because of opportunistic behaviour by management in countries with
weak investor protection. In these countries, the costs of adopting IFRS are
perceived by company insiders as higher due to the loss of private beneﬁts. In
contrast, strong laws protecting investors as well as extensive corporate gov-
ernance recommendation limit private beneﬁts of control, thereby reducing
the costs of switching to IFRS for insiders. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that corpo-
rate governance recommendations have the same impact on IFRS adoption as
hard laws and are able to compensate for the negative impact of weak laws.
In other words, corporate governance can effectively reduce the conﬂict of
interest between insiders and outsiders. However, we also ﬁnd that for some
speciﬁc shareholder rights, such as voting rights and rights of the general
meeting, hard laws are needed in order to effectively constrain the extraction
of private beneﬁts.
In summary, the level of investor protection appears to be crucial for
restraining managerial opportunism, as managers determine the amount and
quality of the information they provide to capital markets on the basis of
their loss of private beneﬁts of control. As a consequence, the mandated
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adoption of IFRS in 2005 is justiﬁed as it reduces the amount of private
beneﬁts insiders can extract, especially in countries with weak protection of
shareholders. Therefore, investors do beneﬁt from the mandated adoption of
IFRS. Those beneﬁts would not have been obtained if the adoption of IFRS
was left to the choice of insiders.
A caveat of this study certainly is that the countries under study are all
civil law countries. An extended study using a wider variety of countries that
differ more in terms of economic development and level of regulation would
be interesting.
APPENDIX
TABLE A1 – STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
I. Legal basis and compliance (1)
1. Comply-or-explain principle Yes / No
II. Scope (1)
2. Encouraged to all companies Yes / No
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
III. Mission of the board (5)
3. Shareholder value maximization Yes / No
4. Long-term viability of the company Yes / No
5. Good relationship with stakeholders Yes / No
6. Effective monitoring of management Yes / No
7. Compliance with laws Yes / No
IV. Key functions of the board (6)
8. Guide corporate strategy Yes / No
9. Monitor and replace key executives Yes / No
10. Review remuneration Yes / No
11. Manage potential conﬂicts of interest Yes / No
12. Guard integrity of ﬁnancial reporting Yes / No
13. Increase effectiveness of governance
practices Yes / No
V. Independence of the board (3)
14. Separation of chairman and CEO Yes / No
15. Mix of inside and outside directors
Non-executive directors None / minimum number / majority
Independent directors None / minimum number / majority
16. Stock options not allowed as
compensation Yes / No
BOARD COMMITTEES
VI. Recommended committees (3)
17. Appointment committee Yes / No
18. Remuneration committee Yes / No
19. Audit committee Yes / No
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TABLE A1 – (continued)
VII. Key functions of the committees (7)
20. Appointment committee: propose
appointment of directors Yes / No
21. Remuneration committee: recommend
remuneration for directors Yes / No
22. Audit committee: report to the board Yes / No
23. Audit committee: hear the company
auditors Yes / No
24. Audit committee: ensure appropriateness
and consistency of accounting policies Yes / No
25. Audit committee: verify accuracy of
internal procedures Yes / No
26. Audit committee: appoint auditor and
determine audit fee Yes / No
VIII. Independence of the committees (6)
27. Appointment committee:
non-executive directors None / minimum number / majority
28. Appointment committee:
independent directors None / minimum number / majority
29. Remuneration committee:
non-executive directors None / minimum number / majority
30. Remuneration committee:
independent directors None / minimum number / majority
31. Audit committee:
non-executive directors None / minimum number / majority
32. Audit committee:
independent directors None / minimum number / majority
SHAREHOLDERS
IX. Shareholders’ protection (4)
33. Equal treatment of shareholders Yes / No
34. One share/one vote Yes / No
35. No anti-takeover devices Yes / No
36. Proxy voting allowed Yes / No
X. General meeting (4)
37. Select new directors Yes / No
38. Participate in decisions concerning
fundamental changes Yes / No
39. Decide on distribution of proﬁts Yes / No
40. Ask questions Yes / No
DISCLOSURE
XI. Quality (2)
41. Use high quality accounting standards Yes / No
42. Audited by an independent auditor Yes / No
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TABLE A1 – (continued)
XII. Timing (1)
43. Timely disclosure of relevant information Yes / No
XIII. Contents (7)
44. Financial situation Yes / No
45. Performance Yes / No
46. Ownership Yes / No
47. Governance Yes / No
48. Relevant interests of directors Yes / No
49. Composition of the board Yes / No
50. Remuneration of key executives Yes / No
TABLE A2 – STRUCTURE OF THE LAW INDEX
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
I. Responsibilities of the board (6)
1. Probity of ﬁnancial statements Yes / No
2. Monitor management Yes / No
3. Guide corporate strategy Yes / No
4. Guard compliance with laws and regulations Yes / No
5. Fiduciary duty towards shareholders Yes / No
6. Avoid conﬂicts of interests Yes / No
II. Independence of the board (3)
7. Separation of chairman and CEO Yes / No
8. Non-executive directors Yes / No
9. Independent directors Yes / No
SHAREHOLDERS
III. Shareholders’ protection (9)
10. Proxy voting allowed Yes / No
11. Pre-emptive right to new issues Yes / No
12. One share/one vote Yes / No
13. Equal treatment of shareholders Yes / No
14. Anti-takeover devices prohibited Yes / No
15. Shares not blocked before meeting Yes / No
16. Cumulative voting allowed Yes / No
17. Oppressed minorities mechanism installed Yes / No
18. Percentage needed to call an extraordinary GM Yes / No
IV. General Meeting (7)
19. Ask questions Yes / No
20. Submit proposals Yes / No
21. Decide on remuneration of directors Yes / No
22. Select directors Yes / No
23. Decide on distribution of proﬁts Yes / No
24. Appoint statutory auditor Yes / No
25. Agree on fundamental changes Yes / No
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TABLE A2 – (continued)
DISCLOSURE
V. Quality (1)
26. Audited by an independent auditor Yes / No
VI. Contents (1)
27. Remuneration Yes / No
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